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21.1 Introduction
In the future, the functions of autonomous driving could fundamentally change all road
trafﬁc; to do so, it would have to be implemented on a large scale, in series production. In
general, a technical system such as a car needs to be released for it to make the transition
from the development phase to mass production [1]. According to the principles of project
management, production release is only granted when the previously deﬁned requirements
have been fulﬁlled by this technical system. These requirements come from a wide range
of sources, such as customers, standards or legislation. Various areas are addressed by the
requirements: these include the requirements for the safety of the technical system for type
approval1 and product liability2 reasons.
The safety of people in public road trafﬁc is one of the oft-quoted motivations for
vehicle automation, because the vast majority of present-day accidents are caused by
human drivers. Based on this motivation is the requirement that substituting humans does
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1According to Directive 2007/46/EG [2], the expression “(…) ‘type approval’ describes the
procedure whereby one Member State certiﬁes that a type of a vehicle (…) satisﬁes the relevant
administrative provisions and technical requirements”.
2Reuter [3] states: “(Tortious) product liability serves to protect any person (product users as well as
uninvolved third parties) from unsafe products. Product liability regulates the compensation of
damage to health or property that has been caused by a product defect”.
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not reduce the safety of public road trafﬁc. This should apply to both passengers and the
entire trafﬁc system in which the autonomous vehicle is in motion. What this requirement
means, and whether it would actually be fulﬁlled upon the introduction of the autonomous
vehicle, is the focus of the following discussion.
A starting point is provided by Gasser et al. [4]: The report from the German Federal
Highway Research Institute considers the development of accident numbers upon the
introduction of vehicle automation. Starting from the total number of accidents for con-
ventional driving (see Fig. 21.1, blue and green ﬁeld) it is assumed that accidents (green
ﬁeld) are avoided by means of vehicle automation. However, new accidents could also be
caused by the risks of automation (yellow ﬁeld).
This representation does not differentiate in terms of the severity of the accident, but
the severity of the accident is also relevant when considering the impact on safety. Safety
is generally described as the absence of unreasonable risks. This risk is deﬁned as a
product of the probability of an accident and the severity of that accident.
Figure 21.2 illustrates in a qualitative way this theoretical risk avoidance potential
depending on the severity of the accident. Here Fig. 21.2 adheres to the ﬁndings of
Heinrich [5] and Hydén [6] that accidents of decreasing severity occur in larger numbers.
The scale of the related severity of the accident is ordinal, meaning that there is clearly an
order between the different degrees of severity: For example, a fatality is weighted as
graver than a serious injury. However, academics are divided on the relative weighting of
these different degrees. While degrees of severity are compared in terms of costs, this is
contentious and will not be discussed further in this work.
Fig. 21.1 Theoretical potential
for avoiding accidents with
vehicle automation [4]. Image
rights: Gasser
Fig. 21.2 Theoretical potential for avoiding accidents with vehicle automation with consideration
of gravity of accident (similar to [4]). Image rights: Author has copyright
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Considering the severity and the number of accidents shows that while risks are
removed (Fig. 21.2 green area), there are risks remaining (Fig. 21.2 blue area) which are
not addressed by vehicle automation. In addition, new risks are created by the substitution
of humans and the automated execution of the driving. The human is no longer available
as a backup in the case of a failure or a defect. The yellow area in Fig. 21.2 illustrates this
additional risk. It is uncertain here whether the removal of risks and the creation of
additional risks is uniform across the degrees of severity. It is possible that there is a
greater reduction in serious accidents but an increase in less serious accidents. Figure 21.2
illustrates this idea via the deformation of the assumed triangle.
For the approval of fully-automated driving, this means that not only a reduction in the
number of accidents must be proven, but rather an accepted ratio Vacc between avoided
Ravo and additionally caused risks Radd.
Vacc ¼ RaddRavo
Contrary to many assertions, it has not yet been proven that a ratio of less than 1 is
actually necessary for the approval. Will autonomous vehicles actually increase trafﬁc
safety? If the ratio were greater than 1, the system would reduce trafﬁc safety. Examples
exist today whereby corresponding added beneﬁts create acceptance for additional risks:
For example, for many motorcyclists the experience of freedom, driving pleasure, etc.,
balances out the considerable additional risk compared to other means of transport. In
addition the apportionment of beneﬁts and risks facilitates the acceptance of motorcycling.
The added beneﬁts and the additional risk mainly affect the person on the motorcycle. The
risk for other road users created by a motorcycle lies between the risks created by a bicycle
and a car, and therefore motorcycling is acceptable without added beneﬁts for other road
users.
In this document, no speciﬁc value is determined for the acceptable ratio for autono-
mous driving, because this value is the result of a complex discussion among those who
would be affected by autonomous driving. This value varies depending on various factors
such as societal, political and economic differences. A vivid example of this is the
acceptance of the use of nuclear energy in Germany, the USA or Japan in the last years:
On the one hand, the accepted ratio varies considerably between the countries, and on the
other, this changes over time, so that for example in Germany in 2012, a nuclear phase-out
was decided on.
The central component of this document is the evaluation of autonomous driving, i.e.
the study of the methods that are to enable safety assessment of autonomous vehicles.
Even though a large number of papers describe the potential of autonomous driving in
theory, the authors are not aware of any document that has conducted this evaluation. In
order to show why this is so, we will ﬁrst describe the current release concepts in the
automobile industry, and then show what the requirements are for test concepts. In the
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third section, we describe the special features of autonomous driving in relation to current
systems. On the basis of this, the fourth section looks at the special challenge for the
production release of autonomous vehicles. The approaches that address this challenge are
discussed, and then a conclusion on the production release of autonomous vehicles is
drawn in the ﬁnal section.
21.2 Current Test Concepts in the Automobile Industry
The safety validation concepts currently used in the automobile industry are for obtaining
approval for four distinct automation levels. To illustrate the difference for the test of these
systems compared to autonomous driving, these four systems will be explained briefly.
The ﬁrst system in series is the driver-only vehicle without the automation of the driving
task. For these systems, it can be seen that, on the one hand, the components used do not
exceed maximum failure rates, and on the other, that the driver is able to maneuver the
vehicle reliably in road trafﬁc (controllability). Here the abilities of the driver are relied on, as
the results of the conducted tests with test drivers are transferred to future users in the
subsequent area of use. Over the last decades, this has shown itself to be successful in serving
as proof of safety. Despite the increasing number of kilometers driven in road trafﬁc, the
number of accidents remains constant, and the number of fatalities has even fallen.
The second level of automation in series is the assisting system: For systems such as
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) or Lane Keeping Assist (LKA), their functions have to be
covered by the test in addition to the existing scope of testing. The option of a take-over
by the driver and controllability must be provided in systems that actively support the
driving task, increase comfort, and reduce the burden on the driver. The Code of Practice
[7] thus assumes that, in this Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS), responsibility
for vehicle behavior remains with the human driver. For these systems it also applies that
the abilities of the driver are relied on, so that the results of the conducted tests with test
drivers are transferred to future users in the subsequent area of use.
The ﬁrst partly-automated systems have also been approved for use in series cars:
Depending on the speed, ACC in combination with LKA takes over the lateral and
longitudinal control for the driver. According to the deﬁnition, in the third category of
systems, the driver is also responsible for the vehicle behavior. Therefore, this test also
focuses on the possibility for the take-over and the controllability by the driver; and so the
same principle applies as with the assisting system, which relies on the abilities of the
vehicle driver to correct undesired automation behavior. This level of automation presents
the special challenge for the safety validation that results from the conflict between
relieving the driver and the necessary situation awareness of the supervisor of the lateral
and longitudinal control. However, here too the driver is ultimately responsible.
Of particular interest for the test are emergency intervening systems, which automat-
ically intervene in the vehicle control and thus in the vehicle dynamics. The goal of this
fourth category of systems is to counter the driver’s loss of control over the situation. For
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example, Electronic Stability Control (ESC) and Emergency Brake Assist (EBA) are
components of mechatronic brake systems that apply additional or reduced braking force
without any action on the part of the driver, thus actively intervening in the vehicle
dynamics. This is performed during the driver’s loss of control, when the vehicle, in
combination with the driver, is at a higher level of risk. ESC is designed in such a way that
an intervention is carried out when the driver clearly no longer has control over the vehicle
in the current situation (e.g. in the case of extreme over- or understeering). In contrast, the
EBA becomes active when the reaction time and the braking distance before a rear-end
collision are no longer sufﬁcient for a human to prevent this accident. The goal of
validating the system regarding safety requirements is to show that emergency intervening
systems should only become active (true-positive) when the loss of control becomes
obvious and thus there is a severely increased risk. For this, it must be shown that the
false-positive rate becomes as small as possible and/or the effects can be controlled by the
driver; the false-positive and false-negative rates of the EBA mainly depend on the object
detection. Figure 21.3 shows a Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC curve),
which describes this relationship for the object detection.
As these emergency intervening systems are systems with no guaranteed operation, an
increase in safety can be achieved by reduced usage combined with a smaller
false-positive rate. Additionally, these systems enable overriding. ESC and EBA employ
the selective braking of wheels to intervene mainly in the braking system, and various
strategies can be used to override them, by steering and/or accelerating.
As has been shown, the main focus in the development of the four system levels is
controllability by the driver. The goal is either to enable controllability for the driver or to
restore it for him/her (design for controllability). Therefore, the driver as a backup is the
basis for validating current vehicles regarding safety and hence also for the production
release.
The development and veriﬁcation of this controllability for the driver is generally
carried out in accordance with the procedure model in Fig. 21.4. This procedure based on
the V-Model differentiates between the downward branch on the left—development and
Fig. 21.3 Representation of
the principle of a receiver
operating characteristic curve
based on Spanfelner et al. [8].
Image rights: Author has
copyright
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design—and the upward branch on the right—veriﬁcation and validation—as a means of
quality assurance. A test concept is followed for the quality assurance.
As shown by Schuldt et al. [10] in Fig. 21.5, a test concept comprises the analysis of
the test object (object under test—OUT), the test case generation, the test execution and
the test evaluation.
The analysis of the test object and the test case generation should be performed during
the development/design phase, so that the test cases to be carried out are already deﬁned
for the veriﬁcation and validation (see Fig. 21.4 procedure model). According to
Horstmann [11] and Weitzel [9], at present a distinction is made between three methods
for the determination of test cases: One method is the test speciﬁcation based on the
speciﬁcation sheet, whereby test cases are deﬁned based on system speciﬁcations, which
have been set down in speciﬁcation sheets. The second method is the risk-based test
speciﬁcation, whereby risk considerations are used to determine the test cases. The third
method is the interface-based test speciﬁcation, whereby the test cases are selected in
Fig. 21.4 Safety evaluation methods in the development process (according to [9]). Image rights:
Alexander Weitzel et al. Federal Highway Research Institute report: Absicherungsstrategien für
Fahrerassistenzsysteme mit Umfeldwahrnehmung
Fig. 21.5 Procedure for test
concept (according to [10]).
Image rights: Schuldt
Braunschweig
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order to cover the value ranges of the interfaces. For all these methods, the driver-vehicle
system is the basis of the test case determination.
To start with the quality assurance as early as possible, tests are already carried out in
virtual test environments before the ﬁrst test vehicles are ready for testing. The test
execution by means of model- and software-in-the-loop tests works based on simulation
models of the vehicle, the human and the environment. The test cases previously identiﬁed
are used here. The further the development progresses, the greater the number of real
components available for testing. Test benches, driving simulators or testing grounds are
used in these tests. The tests performed using hardware-in-the-loop, driver-in-the-loop or
vehicle-in-the-loop provide information about the quality of the components and functions
being tested. To check the actions and reactions of the driver-vehicle-environment system
(to close the loop), simulation models are also needed in performing these tests. Therefore,
simulation models will be required continuously for the test execution up to this devel-
opment point in order to test the entire vehicle. Simulation models are mappings of reality
in software and have per se the property of simplifying the real world.
As a result of this fact, there currently exists no safety-relevant function in a series
vehicle that has not also been tested with real test vehicles. Thus, for testing current
systems, the automotive industry always falls back on real vehicles, real humans and a real
environment.
A result of the necessary use of real driving is, for example, that before the production
release of the Mercedes Benz E-Class (W212), a total of 36 million test kilometers were
completed [12].3 According to Fach et al. [13], the safety validation of a current driver
assistance system alone requires up to 2 million test kilometers. After 50,000 to
100,000 km were covered in these test drives between two interventions of the ﬁrst level
of the EBA, this high number of test kilometers becomes understandable. This does not
even consider the fact that the more critical second level of the EBA was not triggered
during these test kilometers (compare assertion in Fig. 21.3). This eight-ﬁgure total of test
kilometers is accompanied by considerable costs for the vehicle prototypes, test drivers,
test execution and the evaluation of same. While the time requirement can be reduced by
means of parallel testing with multiple vehicles, additional costs are incurred for the
vehicle prototypes.
This example shows that even for current driver assistance systems, validating safety
based on real driving in road trafﬁc represents an economic challenge for the OEM
(Original Equipment Manufacturer). This challenge grows further against the background
of the increasing number of functions and widening ranges of variants and versions for
each vehicle model. For example, Burgdorf [14], deduces a number of 160 · 270 variants
for the BMW 318i (E90) with components such as body form, engine, transmission, drive,
color, A/C, infotainment.
3“(…) The [E-Class] arrived by way of comprehensive virtual tests with digital prototypes and a
total of 36 million test kilometers (…).” (Retrieved 28/07/2014).
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Therefore, there are already endeavors to use other test execution tools alongside real
driving for ﬁnal safety validation. The only example of this known to the authors is the
homologation of ESC systems. According to ECE Regulation 13H for the EU [15], there
is the option to perform some of these tests in the simulation:
When a vehicle has been tested physically in accordance with section 4, the compliance of
other versions or variants of the same vehicle type can be proven by means of computer
simulations that adhere to the test conditions of section 4 and the test procedures of
section 5.9.
Note that this only applies to the ESC system. As an example, Baake et al. [16]
describe the homologation of ESC systems for vans from Mercedes-Benz in collaboration
with Bosch and IPG CarMaker: Using what are known as master cars, a vehicle model
was created in CarMaker, and these master cars were used to collect reference data on the
basis of which the simulation model was validated. This enabled the simulation-based
recommendation for the approval of further vehicle variants with different settings. Baake
et al. also report on the transfer of this procedure to the Cross Wind Assist
(CWA) function, although this has not yet been done.
21.3 Requirements for a Test Concept
In order to discuss in the following section why full automation poses a particular chal-
lenge for safety validation, we will ﬁrst describe the requirements for test concepts to
assess safety. These are divided into effectiveness and efﬁciency criteria.
21.3.1 Effectiveness Criteria
Representative—valid
The requirement for representativeness has two aspects: On the one hand, the test case
generation must ensure that the test coverage required is achieved. For example, a vehicle
should not only be tested at 20 °C and sunshine, as it will be exposed to snow, rain and
temperatures under 0 °C in real situations. Additionally, vehicle limit samples (tolerances
during production) should be considered in the test case generation. On the other hand, the
test execution must encompass the minimum degree of reality required. This means that
the simpliﬁcation in the representation of reality must not influence the behavior of the
OUT nor the behavior and properties of the environment with respect to real behavior.
Variable
The test execution must provide the option to implement all the test cases deﬁned by the
test case generation.
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Observable
For the test evaluation in particular, it is necessary to observe parameters of the test
execution. Only when the situation can also be described it is possible to make the
statement test “passed” or “not passed”.
21.3.2 Efficiency Criteria
Economical
There are two parts to the requirement for the economical test concept: On the one hand,
the test execution should be prepared and carried out as quickly as possible in order to be
able to provide the persons involved in the development with feedback on the test object
immediately. On the other hand, it must be ensured that the test execution is prepared and
carried out at the lowest cost possible.
Reproducible
Reproducibility greatly reduces the work required for regression tests. For example, if an
error has been detected and the test object modiﬁed accordingly, the goal is to subject the
OUT to a test in the same scenario as before.
In good time
The earlier in the development process that a product can be tested informatively, the
fewer the development steps that need to be repeated in the case of an error.
Safe
The test execution should not exceed the accepted risk for all participants. This must be
considered in particular for real driving, whereby road users are participating in the test
without their knowledge.
The requirements described are fulﬁlled sufﬁciently by the current test concepts, and
therefore the four different automation levels presented are approved. However, the recalls
of all the OEMs, which affect millions of vehicles, indicate that these test concepts
certainly do not address everything. Are these concepts also suitable for validating the
safety of new systems such as autonomous driving for public road trafﬁc? Nothing
changes about the requirements presented. However, as will be described in the following
section, the OUT changes greatly.
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21.4 Special Features of Autonomous Driving
In the following section, the difference between fully-automated driving and current
driving in road trafﬁc is explained. After this, the differences between the trafﬁc systems
for air travel, rail travel and road trafﬁc are present in compact form, so that only limited
ﬁndings from these areas can be transferred.
21.4.1 Comparison Between Current Automation and Full
Automation of Road Vehicles
For the previously described safety validation of the four levels of automation available in
series, the focus was on the vehicle, and in particular on its controllability by the driver. In
the combined representation of the three-level model for human target-oriented behavior
based on Rasmussen [17] and the three-level hierarchy of the driving task based on
Donges [18] in Fig. 21.6, this validation corresponds to the elements with the green
background. The vehicle and its behavior in the longitudinal and lateral directions are
tested; in the process, the behavior or abilities of the future driver are not tested, but only
the possibilities for the test driver to control the vehicle in the test cases by means of
steering and acceleration control. Therefore, the green box only overlaps slightly with the
area that stands for the driver.
For full automation, the abilities of the driver are now omitted and he/she also no
longer functions as a backup. The driving task, i.e. navigation, guidance and
stabilization/control, is taken over by the driving robot. This means that for autonomous
Ref.: Rasmussen, 1983 Ref.: Donges, 1982
Fig. 21.6 Three-level model for human target-oriented behavior based on Rasmussen and the
three-level hierarchy of the driving task based on Donges [18]. Image rights: Donges?—to be
clariﬁed
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driving, there is no test of the controllability, but only a test of the operation of a technical
system. On the one hand, this makes the test easier, because the uncertainties due to the
human and its individual differences no longer need to be covered by the test. On the other
hand, there is no longer the option to use test cases and test drivers to draw conclusions
about other use cases. The human, who generally acts based on skills, rules and knowl-
edge, is omitted.
For the safety validation of current systems, safety must be proven that results from the
driver and the vehicle in combination; however, for the production release of the vehicle,
at present the focus is solely on the vehicle. Additionally assumed, but not tested, is the
“reliability” of the driver. In assessing the autonomous system in terms of safety, the
safety now results exclusively from the technical system of the driving robot and the
vehicle (yellow ﬁeld of Fig. 21.6), which must be proven.
Figure 21.6 shows on the one hand that here the quantity of tasks that must be tested
increases: The driving robot is required for a wide variety of application areas (see Use
Cases Chap. 2) such as navigation, guidance, stabilization/control. This task quantity
presents a particular challenge in public spaces without access limitations. On the other
hand, the task quality of the technical system changes. Current systems are merely
executive or are continuously monitored by a human, while for the autonomous system
the execution of a task must fulﬁll the requirements of the safety discussed at the
beginning of this document.
21.4.2 Comparison of the Stipulations in Air Travel, Road Traffic
and Rail Travel
Along with road trafﬁc, there are other trafﬁc systems in which automation has established
itself. However, the following section will discuss the extent to which the challenges and
solutions from these areas are transferable to vehicle automation.
The automation in (civilian) air travel does not currently provide any examples of full
automation. Even if pilots only very rarely actually perform flying tasks, they are still
present in a supervising and operating capacity. Table 21.1 provides an overview of the
differences in the trafﬁc systems, which was taken from Weitzel et al. [9] and Ständer [19].
For the safety validation, the safety concept for the trafﬁc flow is of particular interest
here, as this shows the differences between air travel and road trafﬁc. Air travel operates in
a legally self-contained trafﬁc space, a collision warning system is mandatory, and
external monitoring of operations is provided by air trafﬁc control.
The railway trafﬁc system provides examples of full automation: For example, an
automated underground railway is in operation in Nuremberg. However, according to
Table 21.1, even in this trafﬁc system the safety concept for the trafﬁc flow in particular
differentiates between road trafﬁc and the railway. There is a legally self-contained trafﬁc
space for rail travel; in addition, logic-based systems and external monitoring are used to
avoid a collision between two trains.
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Table 21.1 Comparison of the conditions in the trafﬁc systems, taken from Weitzel et al. [9] and
based on Ständer [19]
Air travel Road trafﬁc Rail travel
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As a mixed operation, road trafﬁc does not fulﬁll the condition of a self-contained
trafﬁc space and external monitoring. The differences show why solutions for the pro-
duction release cannot be transferred directly to autonomous driving.
This comparison should not exclude the possibility that all solutions from air travel and
rail travel are of no interest for road trafﬁc. Certainly similar problems exist, such as the
reliability of safety-relevant components.
21.5 The Challenge of Releasing Fully-Automated Vehicles
for Production (the “Approval-Trap”)
As has been shown, the functions of autonomous driving as an OUT differ fundamentally
from current road vehicles, but also from means of transportation in air and rail travel.
Therefore, we now want to determine how meaningful the current test concepts presented
would be when transferred onto autonomous driving. We will also discuss what the effects
would be of continuing with the current test concept.
21.5.1 Validity of the Current Test Concept
for Autonomous Driving
It has already been explained that a test concept consists of test case generation and test
execution. Now we want to discuss how and whether both are transferable to autonomous
driving.
Test case generation
The three procedures for test case generation have already been explained briefly in
Sect. 21.2; these procedures are based on the assumption of the driver’s driving capability.
The question of whether a random driver can control the test object is tied to the legally
stipulated driver’s license. According to the Road Trafﬁc Act (§ 2 Abs. 2 StVG), this
driver’s license is only issued if, among other things:
– the applicant has attained a minimum age,
– he/she is suitable for driving a motor vehicle,
– he/she has received training,
– and has passed theoretical and practical tests.
And according to § 2 Abs. 4 StVG, suitable is taken to mean:
A person is suitable for driving motor vehicles if he/she fulﬁlls the necessary physical and
mental requirements and has not substantially or repeatedly contravened trafﬁc regulations or
criminal laws.
On the basis of this required driving capability on the part of the driver, the test case
generation is limited to example situations: It is assumed that when the test driver has
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mastered these example situations, he/she and every other driver with a driver’s license
will also master the other relevant non-tested situations when driving. These include
situations in which the driver is actively driving, but also those situations in which the
driver is supervising the system and, if necessary, takes over control. Therefore, in
combination with the driver’s license test, these test cases provide a metric that allows a
conclusion to be drawn about the safety of the driver-vehicle system. The way in which it
would be possible to optimize the practical driver’s license test as an evaluation basis for
assessing the driving capability is discussed by Bahr [20].
In the absence of the driver, the currently accepted metric no longer applies, and
therefore the reduction of the test cases is no longer admissible. The test case generation
for autonomous driving must cover the driving capabilities in particular—a new quality of
functions—which the human previously brought to the driver-vehicle system. The theo-
retical and practical tests of the driver’s license test do not represent the difﬁculty here.
However, the following paragraphs—§ 10 Minimum Age, § 11 Suitability and § 12
Visual Faculty of the Driver’s License Regulation—present the challenge. Therefore,
these paragraphs stand implicitly for comprehensive requirements for the properties of the
humans who perform driving tasks. The human who fulﬁlls these requirements has
– experienced hundreds of thousands of kilometers as a road user,
– experienced social behavior as a member of society,
– learned cognitive abilities,
– trained sensomotor abilities,
– etc.
The authors are not currently aware of any method for validly testing these functions
for a technical system. Therefore, the accepted metric and the reduction of the test cases
no longer apply if the human is removed from the responsibility of performing the driving
task. The current test cases are not meaningful for releasing automated vehicles for
production, and therefore the test case generation must be adapted to the new system.
Test execution
As has already been shown, different methods ranging from HiL to SiL to real driving are
used for the test execution. At present, real driving is the most important method for the
approval; the reason for this, in particular, is the validity combined with the justiﬁable
economic overhead. However, along with the economic overhead, autonomous driving
also presents a systematic challenge for the known methods. At present, real driving
stands for driving in public road trafﬁc with test drivers. The task of the test driver is to
drive or supervise the vehicle in every situation in accordance with the task of the vehicle
user. Transferred to autonomous driving, the use of a test driver in the driver’s seat would
be non-real behavior of a user, as the user does not have to supervise the vehicle and the
environment anymore and intervene. Additionally, the vehicle could also participate in the
road trafﬁc without passengers (depending on the use case), and therefore a test driver
would represent a non-real component in the vehicle. As a result, there is a risk that the
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use of a test driver could influence the other road users and alter their behavior. Further
reflections on this topic can be found in the Chap. 7.
Therefore, along with the test case generation, the current test execution is not directly
transferable to autonomous driving.
21.5.2 Millions of Kilometers on Public Roads Until the Production
Release of Fully-Automated Vehicles
The following theoretical consideration will show what it means to retain the current test
concept despite the differences shown. Let us assume that a reduction in the test cases is
not possible for autonomous driving, because no method exists, as with the driver’s
license test for humans. The objective is still to draw a conclusion as to whether the risk is
increased or not by the use of the autonomous vehicle:
Vacc ¼ RaddRavo\1
Here we should note once again that this condition is in no way imperative. However,
for the theoretical consideration, a condition of less than 1 is assumed to be the worst case
scenario.
The only metric that the authors are aware of that can be used to determine such a
relationship are the ﬁgures from the subsequent evaluation of trafﬁc accidents. For Ger-
many, these are the ﬁgures from the Federal Statistical Ofﬁce. For example, for 2012 the
Federal Statistical Ofﬁce [21] cites 3375 fatal accidents recorded by the police in Ger-
many. The ﬁgure for fatalities is used because this represents the worst case scenario for
the veriﬁcation required. With a total of 709 billion km driven in Germany, this ﬁgure
represents an average of 210 million km between two fatal accidents. As these ﬁgures only
represent an expected value, shorter or longer distances also exist between two accidents.





Here it is assumed that the occurrence of an accident is an independent and
non-exhaustive random process PkðkÞ. In the equation, k corresponds to the number of
accident events and k to the expected value with which this event occurs. The expected
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whereby stest stands for the observed test kilometers and sleist for the performance of the
system. The performance stands for the expected number of kilometers between the
accidents. The probability distributions for k ¼ ½1 2 3 4 5 and k ¼ ½1 2 are shown in
Fig. 21.7 as an example.
The ﬁgure clearly illustrates the problem of providing veriﬁcation of a certain level of
risk: Let us assume that the blue distribution stands for an autonomous vehicle and the red
distribution for a driver-only vehicle. Both vehicles are driven the same number of test
kilometers stest ¼ as  s, with the distance factor as ¼ 2 and the average interval s between
two fatal accidents. The performance sperf ¼ aperf  s of the autonomous vehicle is greater
than that of the driver-only vehicle by the performance factor aperf ¼ 2. Consequently, for
the autonomous vehicle k ¼ 1, and for the driver-only vehicle k ¼ 2.
Even though the autonomous vehicle is characterized by double the performance of the
driver-only vehicle according to the previous assumption, during the test the autonomous
vehicle was involved in a fatal accident (probability P1ð1Þ ¼ 1  e1  0; 37), but not the
driver-only vehicle (probability P2ð0Þ ¼ 1  e2  0; 14). Therefore, a conclusion that the
autonomous vehicle is less safe than the driver-only vehicle must be called into question.
In any case, this example shows that a distance factor as greater than 2 is necessary to be
able to draw a conclusion with a sufﬁciently high signiﬁcance about the performance of
autonomous driving.
From a scientiﬁc point of view, for example, an error probability of 5 % must be
assumed, and therefore the same signiﬁcance level e ¼ 5% must be used. A corre-
spondingly large distance factor as must be selected, depending on the number of acci-
dents, in order to have a probability of less than 5 % for a vehicle with a lower
performance to achieve this low number of accidents. Figure 21.8 shows the result of this
consideration and the numeric calculation of the values.
Fig. 21.7 Poisson probability
distribution for the number of
accidents with different
expected values. Image rights:
Author has copyright
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The data point at zero fatal accidents means that, with a distance factor of as  3, the
probability is less than 5 % that a worse vehicle than the comparison group is not involved
in a fatal accident.
Unfortunately, the probability of success for this test is just as small. Because if the test
vehicle is just as good as the comparison group, i.e. performance factor aperf ¼ 1 applies,
it follows that the probability of success for this veriﬁcation is also only 5 %. For the test
to be successful, a greater probability of success is desirable. As an example, a probability
of success of 50 % is now demanded; by which a test shows that the test vehicle is not
worse than the comparison group. For this, the test vehicle must perform better than the
test group. Figure 21.9 shows the result of this consideration.
The ﬁrst point expresses the following: If the test vehicle is approx. 4.3 times better
than the comparison group, the test is successful with a probability of 50 % that the test
vehicle with an error probability of 5 % is better than the comparison group.
Fig. 21.8 Distance factor at
signiﬁcance level 5 %. Image
rights: Author has copyright
Fig. 21.9 Distance factor over
performance factor at a signif-
icance level of 5 % and a
probability of success for the
test of 50 %. Image rights:
Author has copyright
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What this result now means for the test drive with the autonomous vehicle is
demonstrated by the distance of 210 million km between two fatal accidents. The last
point in Fig. 21.9 expresses the following: If the autonomous vehicle is approx. twice as
good ðaperf  2Þ as the comparison system (current vehicles), a test distance of at least
2.1 billion km must be driven ðstest ¼ as  210Mio kmÞ. In this case, the veriﬁcation has
been achieved with 50 % probability, but ﬁve accidents would also occur with the same
probability.
Ironically, it follows from this consideration that the easier the vehicle driving is, the
greater the number of test kilometers that must be driven, as the comparison value is
correspondingly higher. For the interstate pilot, the current ﬁgures of the Federal Statis-
tical Ofﬁce indicate a comparison value of 662 million km between two fatal accidents.
Accordingly, 6.62 billion test kilometers must be driven on the interstate in order to
correspond to the presented conditions.
This theoretical excursion into statistics shows that production release can become a
challenge, if not an actual trap, for autonomous driving. Hereby, a number of factors for
determining the test kilometers have not been addressed yet; for example, a variation of
the system would mean that the test kilometers would have to be driven again, or the test
with and without passengers could use a factor of two in the calculation. The effect on the
determined necessary kilometers of different parameters not considered here such as area
of use, accident severity, accident cause and comparison vehicle, is derived in detail in
Winner [22].
These considerations are theoretical observations with freely made assumptions.
However, this approach is still suitable for illustrating the problems and challenges, and
for motivating the approaches that follow here.
21.6 Possible Approaches for Solving the Challenge of Testing
As has been shown, autonomous driving represents a new OUT which, due to its prop-
erties, calls the classic test concepts into question. New approaches are required to
overcome the testing challenge described: Accordingly, the next section will discuss why
reusing approved functions, and thus an evolutionary approach, seems necessary from the
perspective of safety validation. After this, we will discuss existing approaches that could
speed up testing.
21.6.1 Reusing Approved Functions
The ﬁrst and simplest possibility of obtaining the production release for a new system is in
reusing functions already released. If a system is used in the same way as before, a release
already issued can be taken over. However, if the scope of functions is expanded, this
must be treated again; the smaller the new area involved is, the less work is required.
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Based on this argument, an evolution across all dimensions would seem to be a
possible approach for overcoming the testing challenge. Dimensions here refers, for
example, to the speed, the area of use but also the degree of automation. A distinction can
be made between two perspectives in selecting the evolution steps: From the perspective
of a function developer, due to the reduced speed and the limited access to the scene, the
interstate during a trafﬁc jam is a suitable starting scenario. From the perspective of the
previously presented statistical considerations, a meaningful starting scenario would be
one in which the human as a comparison group would perform as badly as possible, i.e.
making as many errors as possible. As many errors as possible means a short distance,
making the veriﬁcation of the performance easier.
The revolutionary step—an autonomous vehicle without evolutionary intermediate
steps—contradicts this approach and seems unlikely.
21.6.2 Speeding up the Testing
Despite the evolutionary approach, the safety of new functions still has to be validated. To
speed this up, there are basically two adjustments that can be made: Firstly, the What can be
changed, and secondly the How. What test cases need to be inspected, and how will these
tests be performed? Schuldt et al. [10] call this the test case generation and the test execution.
21.6.2.1 Test Case Generation
The test case generation deﬁnes the tests to be carried out. According to Schuldt et al.
[10], the large number of influencing factors in the area of use and their value ranges result
in a conspicuous number of test cases. As already described, the systems currently in use
are based on the capability of humans and their options for controlling the vehicle. This
results in a stark reduction in the test cases theoretically required. Therefore, a metric
exists that enables a conclusion about the safety without testing all the situations. This
reduction does not apply for the autonomous vehicle, and therefore new ways must be
found of reducing the number of test cases for the autonomous vehicle. During the test
case generation, the requirements for a test concept detailed in Sect. 21.3 must be con-
sidered. In particular, the representativeness is at risk when test cases are omitted.
Here the approaches from Glauner [23] and Eckstein [24] describe the identiﬁcation of
relevant or critical situations in public road trafﬁc. Based on previously deﬁned event
classes, potential critical situations are identiﬁed during the test drives or large-scale ﬁeld
studies. These critical situations are incorporated into the test case generation, and less
critical situations can be omitted as a result. This reduction is based on the assumption that
situations that are less critical are covered by critical situations. A task that remains
unsolved at present is the search for a valid measure of risk that enables an evaluation in
the ﬁrst step, and the selection of critical situations in the second step.
Another procedure for reducing test cases is provided by Schuldt et al. [10]: A generic
test case generation is proposed to cover factors influencing the safety ensured by the
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system as sufﬁciently as possible. This should use black-box testing procedures and
combinatorics, and also be low-redundancy and efﬁcient. This approach is based on
statistical considerations without knowledge and experience of the test object, but it still
has the potential to reduce the test cases required.
The approach described by Tatar and Mauss [25] is also suitable for black-box testing:
an optimization is used for the generation of test cases. Here the input variables of a XiL
simulation are varied in such a way that the evaluation function to be deﬁned for the test is
optimized. Despite the challenge of the valid XiL simulation and the required evaluation
function, this approach provides the option to focus the test cases on those evaluated as
relevant.
A fourth theoretical approach is to use and test a safety concept using formal methods
[26]. Similarly to the human assumed to be a monitor and a part of the safety concept of
current vehicles, a veriﬁed reliable safety concept could make testing the overall func-
tionality of the vehicle in its complete representativeness superfluous. This would make a
reduction of the test cases possible.
21.6.2.2 Test Execution/Test Tool
Along with the possibility of reducing the test cases during the test case generation, the
test execution also has potential for speeding up the process. However, if we deviate from
real driving and select another testing tool for the test execution, there is always an
attendant simpliﬁcation. This is described in more detail by means of Fig. 21.10.
Figure 21.10 divides the testing tools into nine classes which are differentiated based
on how the vehicle and the environment are represented. The passenger is assigned to the
vehicle in this representation, as he/she is situated in the vehicle and does not actively
intervene in the autonomous driving.
Real driving represents both the environment and the vehicle in reality. Accordingly,
during these tests there is the risk of real accidents and their consequences. The envi-
ronment is not controlled, and this results in test situations based on the randomness of
reality; accordingly, the reproducibility for complex situations with other road users is not
a given. This testing tool can be used, at the earliest, with the ﬁrst roadworthy prototypes,









real - real driving
Fig. 21.10 Classiﬁcation of testing tools for testing autonomous vehicles. Image rights: Author has
copyright
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An alternative is to test real vehicles in an artiﬁcial environment: This corresponds to
driving on a test ground, as there situations are created artiﬁcially on the one hand, and on
the other the “road users” are conscious of being involved in a test. Reality is simpliﬁed
for the beneﬁt of safety, variability, observability and reproducibility. From economic
perspectives, while the test cases are tested speciﬁcally and do not have to be experienced
randomly as in real driving, setting up the test ﬁeld requires additional time and ﬁnancial
resources.
Additionally, an artiﬁcial vehicle could move within a real environment; in this case,
artiﬁcial refers to equipping the autonomous vehicle with a supervisor, for example, that
has the option to intervene in the driving task. This could be a test driver with a steering
wheel and pedals, or alternatively a technical system that is superior to the series system
due to its more powerful (additional) sensors. If components are represented artiﬁcially,
the closeness to reality suffers, but gains are made in terms of safety, reproducibility and
observability.
Along with the option of creating the environment and the vehicle artiﬁcially, there are
tools that use a virtual representation in the form of computer simulations. Here the two
ﬁelds that combine the real and the virtual have a gray background, because strictly
speaking they do not exist, because the task of sensors and actuators is to switch between
virtual and real signals. A real radar sensor cannot sense a virtual environment, and a
virtual converter cannot create real voltage.
However, what are possible are combinations of artiﬁcial and virtual environments and
vehicles. Examples of this are provided by different concepts of vehicle-in-the-loop (ViL).
To close the loop made up of actions and reactions of the environment and the vehicle,
real components are mapped in the simulation in the form of models. Here either the
sensors or actuators mentioned are stimulated, i.e. artiﬁcially instigated (examples of this
are simulation-based videos as stimulation for camera systems or dynamometers as
stimulation for drive actuators), or the testing tools directly simulate the power signals,
such as the electromagnetic wave, and try to represent real effects of sensors and actuators
in the simulation with the aid of models. For more information on this, see Bock [27] or
Hendricks [28]. The use of models described calls the meaningfulness of these testing
tools into question. To get valid results using such models, it must be veriﬁed that these
models do not contain any impermissible simpliﬁcations; here impermissible is to be seen
in the context of the function, and means that deviations from reality are only permissible
below the tolerances of the function. However, if this validity has been veriﬁed, the testing
tool enables greater safety during the test execution, as parts of the environment and the
vehicle only encounter each other in the virtual world. Due to the virtual components,
these testing tools are distinguished by greater variability, observability and repro-
ducibility. From an economic perspective, this testing tool has the advantage of varying
the virtual environment easily or representing the vehicle in a wide range of variants. An
economic disadvantage could be the validation of the models (see below). An advantage
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of this testing tool is the option, based on the simulated vehicle, of performing tests early
on during the development.
The last level of abstraction represents the combination of a virtual vehicle and the
virtual environment: The software-in-the-loop testing tool represents the closed control
loop by modeling relevant components in the simulation. In contrast to the previous
testing tools, the entire testing world is virtual. The tests are safe, variable, observable and
reproducible; there is also the option of using this tool early on during the development.
The economic advantage is provided by the hardware independence, as there is no con-
nection to real time any more. The execution of the tests is only limited by the computer
power; simulations can be run day and night, and also parallel on a large scale. On the
other hand, there is the necessary closeness to reality of the virtual test world, and
therefore of every individual model: Only when the validity of the models used can be
veriﬁed are virtual tests sufﬁciently conclusive for a production release. Accordingly, for
the economic consideration of simulation-based procedures, the validation of the models
must be considered above all.
The same challenge exists for the use of formal methods. Mitsch [26] writes in this
context: “We do (…) prove that collisions can never occur (as long as the robot system ﬁts
to the model).” This means that even for formal methods, the degree of reality of the
models used determines the conclusiveness of the results. For example, a particular
challenge that is therefore a focus of the research is the formalization of the uncertainties
of sensors or the property of other road users.
The discussion relating to testing tools shows the potential to speed up the testing. With
the aid of the artiﬁcially created environment and vehicle, test cases can be set up and
executed speciﬁcally. Additionally, the virtual approach enables the tests to be speeded up
and run in parallel, depending on the computer power used.
However, the discussion also shows that the validity of the tests, and therefore their
conclusiveness, presents a challenge when artiﬁcial and virtual components are
introduced.
21.7 Conclusion
Autonomous driving is distinguished in particular by the omission of the human super-
visor of assisted or partially-automated systems, and the supervisor’s ability to correct
these systems. The metric consisting of real driving and driver’s license test that enables a
conclusion about the safety of automation levels currently present in series production, is
no longer valid for autonomous driving. The resulting loss of the reduction in the test
cases means that current test concepts are not suitable for economically assessing the
safety of a new system such as autonomous driving. Adhering to current test concepts
would involve an economically unjustiﬁable overhead, and would result in an
“approval-trap” for autonomous driving. However, the authors see three approaches for
avoiding this “approval-trap”.
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Firstly, the evolutionary approach, or alternatively the transformation (see Chap. 10),
seems necessary, as only the step-by-step introduction along the different dimensions of
speed, scenery and degree of automation enables existing components to be taken over
and reduces the range of tasks for the following releases. Secondly, the necessary test
cases must be reduced based on ﬁeld experience and statistical procedures. The challenge
here is the metric that allows a conclusion to be drawn about the safety of the system
based on the completed test cases. Thirdly, alternative testing tools must be used alongside
real driving. Here it is not expected to be able to do without real driving completely,
because a veriﬁcation of validity is required to move test cases to ViL, SiL and procedures
that formally prove safety.
Finally, it must be stated that the challenges presented should not only be solved
internally by the automobile industry. Even if test concepts are optimized for autonomous
driving, there will not be 100 % safety. Vision Zero remains a vision for now, particularly
in mixed operation with additional road users. With the ﬁrst accident caused by an
autonomous vehicle, at the latest, the previously issued release will be put to the test.
Accordingly, the basis for the production release should be discussed publicly by all
concerned and be designed transparently.
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